Fed Officials Endorse Monetary Commission!

federal reserve, national monetary commission, centennial monetary commission

You heard it here first.YellenandPaul8

According to a report I have before me, straight from the U.S. Senate, prominent Federal Reserve officials, including the presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks of New York and Philadelphia, have publicly endorsed legislation that would establish a bipartisan Monetary Commission authorized "to make a thorough study of the country's entire banking and monetary set-up," and to evaluate various alternative reforms, including a "return to the gold coin standard."  The proposed commission would be the first such undertaking since the Aldrich-Vreeland Act established the original National Monetary Commission in 1908.

Surprised?  It gets better.  The same Senate document includes a letter from the Fed's Chairman, addressed to the Senate Banking Committee, indicating that the Board of Governors itself welcomes the proposed commission.  Such a commission, the letter says, "would be desirable and could be expected to form the basis for conservative legislation in this field."

Can it be?  Have Fed officials had a sudden change of heart?  Have they really decided to welcome the proposed "Centennial Monetary Commission" with open arms?  Is it time to break out the Dom Pérignon, or have I just been daydreaming?

Neither, actually.  Who said anything about the Centennial Monetary Commission?   The Senate report to which I refer isn't about that commission.  It concerns neither S. 1786, the Centennial Monetary Commission bill just introduced in the Senate, nor its House companion, H.R. 2912.  Instead, the report refers to S. 1559, calling for the establishment of a National Monetary Commission.  That's S. 1559, not of the 114th Congress, but of the 81st Congress – the one that sat from 1949 to 1951, when Harry Truman was president.

It turns out, you see, that the Centennial Monetary Commission legislation isn't the first time that Congress has tried to launch a new monetary commission.

Things were, evidently, rather different in 1949 than they are now.  Back then, the Fed was thoroughly under the Treasury's thumb, where it had been throughout World War II.  In particular, it found its powers of monetary control severely diminished by both the vast wartime increase in the Federal debt and by the Treasury's insistence that it intervene to support the market for that debt.  Fed officials hoped to reestablish the Fed's powers of monetary control by having it acquire the ability to set reserve requirements for non-member banks.  In short, Fed officials, including then Federal Reserve Chairman Thomas McCabe (who would later lose his job for standing up to the Treasury), favored a new Monetary Commission because they anticipated that such a commission would end up recommending reforms that would enhance the Fed's then truncated powers.

S. 1559 ended up being killed by the Subcommittee on Monetary, Credit, and Fiscal Policies of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report.  Interestingly, that body argued that the proposed, comprehensive study of the U.S. monetary system should instead "be made by a committee composed exclusively of Members of Congress rather than, as proposed in S. 1559, by a mixed commission composed of Members of Congress, members of the executive department, and members drawn from private life."  As it happens, the  currently proposed Centennial Monetary Commission is to have 12 voting members, all of whom are to be members of Congress. *

As for any possibility that the Centennial Monetary Commission bill might itself garner support from highly-placed Fed officials: fuhgeddaboudit.  Those officials now have all the power they could possibly desire.  Why should they look kindly upon legislation that's far more likely to lessen that power than to enhance it?

Although the fact that the Fed welcomed a new National Monetary Commission in 1949 is no cause for celebration today, supporters of the new reform may still have reason to be cheered by the Fed's earlier stance.  After all, should Fed officials declare themselves against the new proposal, they can be reminded of their predecessors' stance, and asked to explain why they should oppose the same sort of inquiry that those  predecessors considered a jolly good idea.  If they are good for nothing else, their answers should at least be good for a chuckle.


* A person with expert knowledge of the legislation in question tells me that the crossed-out statement is incorrect.  Although the latest version of the Centennial Monetary Commission bill calls for that Commission to have six voting members "appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, with four members from the majority party and two members from the minority party," and another six "appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate, with four members from the majority party and two members from the minority party," it does not require that these appointees themselves be members of Congress.

  • B Cole

    Nice blogging as always…but your language is sometimes pejorative! Perhaps the Federal Reserve should be a part of the Treasur, which you define as "under the thumb of the Treasury."

    By the way, during the Reagan administration various officials suggested that the Fed, in fact, be embedded in the Treasury, including Donald Regan Treasury Secretary.

    I prefer the central bank as part of the Treasury, and that reports to the US president as better, more transparent democracy.

    If the public perceives that the Federal Reserve is not doing its job now, how do they vote?

    But if the Fed reports to the president, there is accountability for results.

  • Em_ptySkin

    How many volumes of writings did the Aldrich National Monetary Commission produce? I'm just reading "The English Banking System" and it says "Volume 18" (I wonder if that is for the Senate session or not). Either way, it seems that the whole thing was a way for some members of Congress to laud the British system of credit based foreign exploitation in some official capacity. It does not make sense to me that the Aldrich and Pujo Committee's would be related in anything other than the broad language of reform.

    The political maneuvers of bank are incredible; the slights they are willing to perpetuate, the misdirection they direct. Without cunning operators out witting banks on significant banking legislation seems like a tall order.